NAME
mac_partition - process partition policy
SYNOPSIS
To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the
following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC
options MAC_PARTITION
Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
following line in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC
and in loader.conf(5):
mac_partition_load="YES"
DESCRIPTION
The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy,
which allows administrators to place running processes into “partitions”,
based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process’s MAC
label). Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that
are in the same partition. If no partition is specified for a process,
it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy
restrictions not defined in this man page). No provisions for placing
processes into multiple partitions are available.
Label Format
Partition labels take on the following format:
partition/value
Where value can be any integer value or “none”. For example:
partition/1
partition/20
partition/none
SEE ALSO
mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)
HISTORY
The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network
Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of
the DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.