Csec_api - Provides authentication in LCG services
On the client side:
int Csec_client_initContext(Csec_context_t *ctx, int service_type,
int Csec_client_establishContext(Csec_context_t *ctx, int socket);
int Csec_client_setSecurityOpts(Csec_context_t *ctx, int opt);
int Csec_client_setAuthorizationId(Csec_context_t *ctx, const char
*mech, const char *name);
On the server side:
int Csec_server_initContext(Csec_context_t *ctx, int service_type,
int Csec_server_reinitContext (Csec_context_t *ctx, int service_type,
int Csec_server_establishContext (Csec_context_t *ctx, int socket);
int Csec_server_getClientId(Csec_context_t *ctx, char **mech, char
int Csec_server_getAuthorizationId(Csec_context_t *ctx, char **mech,
int Csec_server_getDelegatedCredentials(Csec_context_t *ctx, char
**mech, void ** buf, size_t *size);
int Csec_server_setSecurityOpts(Csec_context_t *ctx, int opt);
int Csec_clearContext(Csec_context_t *ctx);
int Csec_getErrorMessageSummary(size_t maxlen);
int Csec_mapToLocalUser(const char *mech, const char *name, char
*username, size_t username_size, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid);
Csec_context_t * Csec_get_default_context();
Csec_api functions allow for the implimentation of strong
authentication mechanisms in LCG servers and clients. Csec_api is
integrated with the LCG framework for errors.
allow to initialize the Csec_context_t structure. The service
type parameter defines which type of key will be used by the
service. Its value can be:
A normal host key (e.g. host/machine_name@DOMAIN for
KRB5) will be used
A LCG Central host type key (e.g.
castorcentral/machine_name@DOMAIN for KRB5) will be used
A LCG disk host type key (e.g.
castordisk/machine_name@DOMAIN for KRB5) will be used
A LCG tape host type key (e.g.
castortape/machine_name@DOMAIN for KRB5) will be used
Given an initialized context and an opened socket, establish a
security context according to the chosen security mechanism.
Given an initialized context, but one that has not yet been used
to establish a security context these functions allow the
selection of various options. Currently supported are:
Requests that delegated credentials from the client are
made available to the server. Either the client or server may
set this option and it will automaticaly limit the selection of
authentication method to one that supports delegation.
(Currently only GSI)
This directs that client/server to disallow delegation. If
the other side requests delegation the establishing of a
security context will fail.
If neither side sets any options the default behaviour is to not
delegate a credential.
Allows a server to retrieve the authentication mechanism and
identification name (eg. principal or DN) from an established
context, ctx. If either of mech or name are NULL no pointer will
be returned. The strings that are returned are associated to the
context, ctx, so should only be used while the context ctx is
valid. If required they should be copied before the context is
reset or cleared.
On the client side an ’AuthorizationId’ may be set against an
initialized but not yet establshed context. The AuthorizationId,
consisting on the pair mech and name, may be treated as any
arbitrary pair of string up to CA_MAXCSECPROTOLEN,
CA_MAXCSECNAMELEN in length. The strings will be made available
to the server. mech is supposed to represent the mechanism type
and name should be an identifying string such as principal or
On the server side, the AuthorizationId may be retrieved after
the security context is established. If the client did not set
any id the server will receive an error when
Csec_server_getAuthorizationId() is called. Pointers to the
mechanism and the name will be returned in mech and name. Either
may be set to NULL, in which case no pointer is returned. Upon
successful return the list of VOMS fqans and the VOMS voname
available to the server will also be reset to those which the
client set manually, or will be emptied if the client did not
set any. The strings returned are associated with the context
and should be copied before the context is reset or cleared.
Allows a server to retrieve a copy of any delegated credential
available from an established context, ctx. The credential is
returned in buf. The size of the data in the buffer is returned
in size. The data should be treated as an opaque structure, the
meaning of which depends on the authentication scheme that was
used. The scheme name is returned in mech. Currently only mech
’GSI’ supports credential delegation and the client or server
must request delegation passing by setting the appropriate flag
with Csec_client_setSecurityOpts() or
Csec_server_setSecurityOpts(). The GSI credential data is
suitable for passing to gss_import_cred(). mech and buf will
point to data conatined within the context, ctx, and should only
be used while ctx remains valid.
This function determines whether an ID (mechanism, name pair)
can be mapped to a local uid/gid and/or username. If the
username is wanted a buffer should be passed in username, the
size of which is indicated with username_size. If the uid/gid
are required uid and gid should be passed. Any of username, uid
or gid may be NULL in which case they are not returned. If both
uid and gid are NULL and username is non-NULL the mapped
username is not required to exist on the local system. ie. the
function will succeed as long as a mapping exists. If either of
uid or gid are non-NULL the mapping and local username must
exist, otherwise Csec_mapToLocalUser() will return an error.
Clears the context and deallocates the memory used.
Utility function that provides the applications with one default
per thread security context that can be used by the security
In case of errors in the Csec_pai layer, the functions return -1 (or
NULL for the functions returning strings), the serrno is set
accordingly. It is possible to get the detailed error message by using
the Csec_getErrorMessage() or Csec_getErrorMessageSummary() functions.
The Csec_getErrorMessageSummary() function will return a summary
message that should need at most maxlen bytes of storage (including the
terminating null). The detail of the message may be cut in various ways
to reduce the length to fix in the specified length.
environment variable or CSEC MECH entry in /etc/shift.conf
This environment variable contains the list of protocols to be
used for authentication. The variable has precedence over the
LCG configuration file.
On the client side, this list is used to choose which security
mechanism should be used to address the server. On the server
side, this is is of list of mechanisms that should be accepted
by the server.
If defined switches the tracing on in the LCG security module.
Tracing information is sent to stderr, unless CSEC_TRACEFILE is
If defined, the LCG security tracing information is written to
afile which name is the value of this variable.
The currently supported methods for authentication are:
KRB5 Kerberos 5 mechanism
KRB4 Kerberos 4 mechanism
GSI Globus Security Infrastructure
ID Unsecure protocol, should be used for testing only.
NOTE ON THREAD SAFETY
If the Csec_api library was compiled thread safe (eg. was built
defining the _THREAD_SAFE macro, which is the standard way) then the
library should be thread safe. If the application using Csec_api also
defines _THREAD_SAFE, Csec attempts to use thread safe versions of any
underlying security libraries that are used for the authentication
For instance, in the case of GSI the thread safe version of Globus may,
in areas other than security, sometimes create threads. If the
application using Csec_api needs to link to the GSI libraries for its
own use then threading flavour should be consistent. Therefore if the
non threaded Globus libraries are required then do not define the
LCG Grid Deployment Team